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It has long been observed that individuals with autism exhibit peculiar 
attentional and perceptual abnormalities. For example, individuals with autism 
frequently notice minor changes in their environments. In one of the earliest 
studies of autism, Kanner noted the following statement made by the mother of a 
child with autism: “On one of the bookshelves, we had three pieces in a certain 
arrangement. When this was changed, he always rearranged it in the old pattern” 
(Kanner, 1943; 1973, p.9). This sort of behaviour is consistent with many 
anecdotal and clinical reports that individuals with autism notice features about 
a situation or event that to others seem small and insignificant. Another example 
of this exquisite perception of detail has been observed when children with 
autism tackle jigsaw puzzles – the solution appears to be derived from the 
shapes of the pieces rather than the printed picture, so that the child with 
autism, unlike a normal child, could as easily complete a jigsaw puzzle with the 
picture facedown as when it is faceup (Frith & Hermelin, 1969). This ability to 
pick out individual features from some larger entity has also been observed 
using the Embedded Figures Task and the block design subtest of the Wechsler 
intelligence scales. Several studies have established that both children and adults 
with autism show superior performance on these tasks compared with normal 
individual and individuals with learning disabilities, matched for mental age 
(Shah & Frith, 1983; Shah and Frith, 1993; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1997). 
 
This set of behaviours can be described as an acute ability to process fine detail, 
an ability that can surpass that of developmentally normal individuals. Over the 
past 10 years, the dominant explanation for these behaviours has been the weak 
central coherence hypothesis (Frith, 1989). In a general form, the hypothesis 
states that individuals with autism have a deficit in integrating disparate 
information in order to extract the “gist” of any situation. The hypothesis is 
flexible enough to allow predictions to be made at many stages of psychological 
processing – from perception and selective attention through to conception. 
Because weak central coherence could operate at any one (or all) of these levels, 
Frith initially thought that this integration deficit might explain both the superior 
perceptual and attentional abilities of individuals with autism and their deficits 
in conceptual-semantic domains of analysis, such as the pragmatic use of 
language and, indeed, the pervasive social deficits (Frith, 1989). However, this 
view has been abandoned in light of empirical investigations suggesting that 
weak central coherence and social deficits may be independent of one another 
(Happé, 1997; Frith & Happé, 1994). As a result, the weak central coherence 
hypothesis has become regarded as the explanation for the special abilities and 
savant skills observed in autism, leaving the theory-of-mind hypothesis (e.g. 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985; Tager-Flusberg, chap 9, this volume) and the 
executive dysfunction hypothesis (see Russell, 1997, and Hughes, this volume) to 
battle over the explanation of the co-occurrence of the characteristic triad of 
impairments in autism (Wing & Gould, 1979). 
  
In this chapter, I argue that more recent evidence is highly suggestive of a causal 
link between the perceptual and attentional abnormalities in individuals with 
autism and their deficits in social processing. Given this, we should perhaps 
readopt the parsimonious position that many aspects of autism stem from one 
underlying deficit. The question then becomes whether this deficit is indeed a 
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weakening of central-coherence mechanisms, or whether weak central 
coherence “effects” may be better explained by alternative mechanisms. This 
question is answered, in part, by reviewing some of the studies that have 
assessed the weak central coherence hypothesis at the level of perception and 
selective attention. On the whole, the evidence is not in its favour, although the 
same cannot be said of studies that assess the weak central coherence 
hypothesis at the level of conception. My argument is that there is an alternative 
explanation of the perceptual and attentional abnormalities in autism to weak 
central coherence that pivots on the notion that individuals with autism are 
unable to draw pieces of information together because of an inability to 
recognize the similarities between stimuli or situations. However, the challenge 
is to assess whether this alternative can also explain weak central coherence 
effects at the conceptual level. I draw on some recent insights concerning 
perceptual and conceptual processes in developmentally normal individuals 
(Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998) to offer possible ways in which a reduced ability to 
process similarity at the perceptual and attentional level of the kind observed in 
autism can lead to abnormalities at the conceptual level.  
 
Weak Central Coherence and Social Information Processing 
 
Historically, research in autism has attempted to find an explanation that could 
account for the entire set of autistic symptoms. In fact, two of the most dominant 
theories, the theory-of-mind deficit (e.g. Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985) and the 
executive dysfunction theory (see Russell, 1997) focus on finding a single 
underlying cause for the triad of impairments (Frith, 1989; Wing & Gould, 1979), 
rather than on the perceptual and attentional profile in autism. What is so 
exciting about the weak central coherence hypothesis is that it stands alone as a 
potential explanation of both the triad of impairments and the perceptual and 
attentional abnormalities. In her original formulation of the hypothesis, Frith 
(1989) described how the inability to draw together into a meaningful pattern 
disparate and complex pieces of information typical of a social interaction could 
easily give rise to a mentalizing deficit. Similarly, she explained that being unable 
to extract the “gist” from a speech stream would prevent an individual from 
understanding the “deeper intentional aspects of communication” (Frith, 1989, 
p.124). She also applied the hypothesis to the presence of repetitive behaviours – 
automatically elicited behaviours that are normally inhibited by the operation of 
those central control processes that are responsible for bringing coherence to 
experience. Thus, in these three areas, weak central coherence will give rise to 
deficits in behaviour compared with that of nonautistic individuals. On the other 
hand, where task success lies in being able to ignore gist or meaning in order to 
focus on details and parts of objects, weak central coherence will give rise to 
superior performance, such as in the case of the Embedded Figures Task and the 
block design task. In this way, the weak central coherence hypothesis elegantly 
captures both the strengths and weaknesses of the autistic disorder.  
 
However, on the basis of studies conducted by Happé (1991; 1997), Frith has 
abandoned the idea that weak central coherences is the single underlying deficit 
in autism (Frith & Happé, 1994). Happé (1991; 1997) compared different groups 
of individuals with autism – individuals who showed no ability to pass theory-of-
   
 
  KC Plaisted-Grant 2015 
mind tasks, individuals who passed first-order theory-of-mind tasks, and 
individuals who passed second-order theory-of-mind tasks – with 
developmentally normal children on the ability to correctly pronounce 
homographs embedded within sentence contexts. Her prediction was that if 
weak central coherence underlies theory-of-mind deficits, then those individuals 
with autism who were unable to pass theory-of-mind tasks would show a deficit 
in the homograph task, whereas those who showed good theory-of-mind 
performance would show a level of performance comparable with that of normal 
children. Because all of the individuals with autism, regardless of their ability to 
solve theory-of-mind tasks, showed deficits on the homograph task, Happé 
(Happé, 1997; 1994) concluded that central coherence and theory-of-mind skills 
were underpinned by independent mechanisms and that individuals with autism 
suffered deficits in both. 
 
One possibility, then, is that weak central coherence underlies the perceptual 
and attentional abnormalities in autism, whereas theory-of-mind deficits and 
executive dysfunction underlie aspects of the triad of impairments. The question 
then becomes one of how these three mechanisms are related, a question 
addressed by others in this volume. However, there is another line of inquiry 
that raises another possibility. This research suggests, contrary to Frith and 
Happé’s conclusions, that central coherence and theory-of-mind performance 
are, in fact, causally linked. If this is so, then we return to the possibility that the 
various aspects of autism may stem from the same underlying psychological 
mechanism. 
 
Some of this research has been conducted by Baron-Cohen and his colleagues 
(Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Joliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 
1997). Each of these studies compared two populations (for example, female and 
male adults, of parents of children with Asperger’s syndrome and parents of 
developmentally normal children, or individual with and without autism and 
those with Asperger’s syndrome) on the Embedded Figures Task as the test for 
central coherence and the “Mind in the Eyes” task as the test for mentalizing. In 
the Mind in the Eyes task, participants were presented with a pair of 
photographic images, each displaying the eye region of a face and asked which of 
the pair indicates a particular mental state, such as “sympathetic” or “concerned” 
or “playful.” In each population of participants, he found an inverse relationship 
between performance on the Embedded Figures Task and the Mind in the Eyes 
task, strongly suggesting a link between central coherence and mentalizing skills.  
 
A similar conclusion was drawn by Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, and Kimenez, 
(2000), who argued that Happé’s (1997) study provides no direct evidence 
against the hypothesis of a causal link between weak central coherence and poor 
theory-of-mind skills, because those individuals who were able to solve second- 
order-theory-of-mind skills were likely to have developed this ability later than 
developmentally normal children. This late development may well have been 
caused by weak central coherence. Accordingly, Jarrold et al. (2000) examined 
the relationship between weak central coherence and theory-of-mind 
performance in individuals with autism on test of mentalizing in the form of a 
battery of theory-of-mind tasks that required belief inference and the Embedded 
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Figures Task. Significant inverse correlations between the two were found when 
verbal mental age and verbal mental age plus chronological age were partialled 
out.  
 
Evaluating Perceptual Weak Central Coherence 
 
These studies resurrect the potential importance of the weak central coherence 
hypothesis as an explanation of the major characteristics of autism. Thus, the 
central issue becomes what are the mechanisms of weak central coherence? Only 
by addressing this can we discover how weak central coherence explains the 
various symptoms of autism. The difficulty, however, is that the weak central 
coherence hypothesis is a rather unformulated notion. Frith’s use of the word 
“central” refers to processes that are marshaled in order to extract the overall 
meaning from a range of informational inputs (Frith, 1989). If these processes 
are truly “central”, then weak central coherence might be expected to affect 
many levels of processing, from perception (often referred to as weak central 
coherence at “lower” levels) to conception (often referred to as weak central 
coherence at “higher” levels). The problem is knowing what the central 
processes are. For example, they could be those processes responsible for 
building a mental model or schema (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Or they could be 
attentional control processes, which select from a range of input that which is 
goal-relevant and inhibit that which is not. However, it is not at all clear how 
deficits in these sorts of processes would give rise to weak central coherence at 
the level of perception. Perceptual weak central coherence may be more likely 
the result of abnormal or weakened gestalt processes, responsible for the 
integration of the component parts of a stimulus into a global whole. And, if this 
is the case, the word “central” becomes redundant, because gestalt processes are 
usually thought of as innate principles of perceptual organization. 
 
Most researchers who have tested weak central coherence in autism at the 
perceptual level have adopted the idea that weak central coherence derives from 
a deficit in perceptual integration processes, which weakens the ability to 
perceive a gestalt. Hierarchical stimuli, in which a larger figure such as a letter h 
is composed of a number of other smaller figures, such as the letter s, were used 
in at least four studies (Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Mottron, Burack, Stauder, & 
Robaey, 1999; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994; Plaisted, 
Swettenham, & Rees, 1999). In such tasks, the participant is required to respond 
to either the larger global figure or to the smaller local figures. Typically, 
(although not always) developmentally normal individuals respond faster and 
more accurately to the global than to the local level of the stimulus (Navon, 
1977). And, contrary to the expectations of the weak central coherence 
hypothesis, the same has been found for individual with autism. If the weak 
central coherence hypothesis is interpreted in its strictest sense, as a deficit in 
the integration of stimulus input resulting in an inability to perceive gestalt 
wholes, these results can be seen as staunch evidence against it.  
 
Frith probably did not have this in mind, as she states that weak central 
coherence comes about because individuals with autism cannot see the need to 
draw separate pieces of information (or at the perceptual level, parts of a 
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stimulus or scene) together (Frith, 1989). This implies that individuals with 
autism should be able to perceive a gestalt, but have a tendency to attend to the 
local parts of the stimulus. And, on the whole, these studies primed participants 
to attend to either the global or the local level prior to a block of trials, by telling 
them to identify the large (global) letter or the small (local) letter. Thus, 
according to the idea that individuals with autism do not ordinarily see the need 
to attend to the global whole, it is not surprising that when they are explicitly 
informed of the need to attend to the global level, they process the gestalt figure 
in the normal way. However, we (Plaisted et al., 1999) also included a task that 
required participants to inspect both the local level and global level of the 
stimulus on each trial, a procedure that prevented priming attention to one or 
another level by instruction. Under these conditions, individuals with autism 
exhibited a weak-central-coherence effect by responding more accurately to the 
target figure at the local than the global level.  
 
This finding can be seen as consistent with Frith’s version of the weak central 
coherence hypothesis, that in the absence of a drive for global meaning, 
individuals with autism have a tendency to attend to the local level. However, the 
important fact is that the weak central coherence theory does not tell us why 
such as effect should come about – it simply describes the effect. We (Plaisted et 
al., 1999) suggested that one reason may lie in the relative levels of activity in the 
two visual channels responsible for high- and low-spatial-frequency processing. 
The faster and more accurate responding to the global level of a hierarchical 
stimulus in developmentally normal adults may relate to the relatively higher 
levels of activity in low-spatial-frequency channels (Badcock, Whitworth, 
Badcock, & Lovegrove, 1990). When adults are adapted to low–spatial-frequency 
gratings, preferential global processing reverses to preferential local processing. 
If this balance is reversed in autism, the local level should be processed prior to 
the global. Furthermore, the relative levels of activity in these visual channels do 
not appear to be fixed, but can be modulated by attentional processing, possibly 
mediated by parietal mechanisms (Robertson & Lamb, 1991). When adults 
search for a target that is more likely to appear at the local than the global level, 
they show faster and more accurate performance at the local compared with the 
global level (Kinchla, Solis-Macias, & Hoffman, 1983). Thus, the level of the 
stimulus that should be attended to can be primed, and this appears to override, 
in developmentally normal individuals, any “default” setting of activity levels 
within the spatial frequency channels. The normal performance of individuals 
with autism on hierarchical stimulus tasks in which target levels are primed 
suggests that this is also the case in autism. 
 
A similar analysis could be applied to the finding that individuals with autism do 
not succumb to all visual illusions. Happé (1996) assessed children with autism 
on their propensity to succumb to six visual illusions. Although a similar 
percentage of children with autism and children with learning disabilities 
matched for mental age succumbed to one of the illusions (the Muller-Lyer), a 
rather lower percentage of children with autism succumbed to the remaining 
five (the Ponzo, Kanisza, Tithcner, Hering and Poggendorf illusions). This might 
be explained by enhanced levels of activity in high-spatial-frequency visual 
channels, thereby providing sufficiently more information about the local parts 
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of the illusory figures to prevent the illusion that is derived only from low-
spatial-frequency information concerning the global level. If global processing 
operates normally in autism when primed by instruction, then this effect should 
disappear when children with autism are asked a question about the illusion that 
refers to the global level. Some consistent evidence is available from a study in 
progress that is being conducted by Scott, Brosnan, and Wheelwright 
(submitted). They wondered whether the participants with autism in Happé’s 
study (1996) interpreted the questions asked (e.g., “Are these two lines the same 
length?” in the Ponzo illusion) in a literal way. They therefore asked their 
participants two questions about each illusion, one of which referred to the 
actual form of the stimulus (e.g., “Is there a triangle?” in the case of the Kanisza 
triangle illusion) and another that referred to the appearance of the stimulus 
(e.g., “Does it look like there is a triangle?”). They found that individuals with 
autism can see the actual form of the stimulus and the illusion. The appearance 
question could therefore prime the individual with autism to attend to the global 
level of the stimulus, thus overriding otherwise enhanced local processing. 
 
There are very few other convincing demonstrations of perceptual weak central 
coherence. Jarrold and Russell (1997) attempted to test the hypothesis by asking 
children to count dot stimuli, which were presented either in canonical form (i.e., 
like the arrangement of dots on dice) or in a distributed form, where the dots 
appeared randomly arranged with several other distracters (small squares). 
They suggested that, according to the weak central coherence hypothesis, 
children with autism should show no benefit for dots arranged canonically, 
whereas developmentally normal children and children with learning disabilities 
would find counting easier in the canonical condition than in the distributed 
condition. Although there were no differences between groups for counting in 
the two conditions when there were only three and four dots, the two groups 
without autism showed more benefit from having stimuli presented in canonical 
form that in distributed form when there were five or six dots to count. However, 
Jarrold and Russel (1997) note that some children within the group with autism 
showed as much benefit from canonical presentations as the other groups, and 
the proportion of these “global” counters did not differ significantly from the 
proportion of global counters in the group of children with learning disabilities. 
 
In one study that is frequently cited in favor of perceptual weak central 
coherence, Shah and Frith (1993) compared developmentally normal individuals 
and individuals with autism on a “pre-segmented” from of the block-design task 
They argued that if individuals with autism fail to perceive the overall gestalt of 
the pattern, they should, unlike developmentally normal individuals and 
individuals with learning disabilities, show no benefit from the presentation of 
the pattern to be copied in a segmented form compared with their performance 
when it is presented as a complete form. Shah and Frith (1993) also compared 
groups on patterns presented rotated versus nonrotated and patterns with and 
without oblique lines. They found an interaction between groups only in the 
segmented versus nonsegmented condition. Thus, nonautistic groups appeared 
to benefit no more than individuals with autism by nonroated and non-oblique 
line patterns but were facilitated by segmentation. 
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There are, however, reasons to be cautious about this result. When separate 
analyses were conducted on the data, Shah and Frith (1993) found that the 
interaction between the older normal and high-IQ persons with autism was not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 probability level. One way of salvaging the 
weak central coherence hypothesis in the light of this nonsignificant result might 
be to say that if the block-design task marshals the same processes as the 
Embedded Figures Task, then, given that performance on the Embedded Figures 
Task improves with age, so may performance on the block-design-task. Thus, by 
the age of 16 years, developmentally normal individuals may perform to the level 
of individuals with autism on both segmented and unsegmented forms of the 
task. However, the weak central coherence hypothesis fares less well from this 
explanation for the comparison between younger and low-IQ persons with 
autism, which yielded a significant interaction. If developmentally normal 
individuals’ performance improves with age, then superior performance would 
be expected from a group of 18-year–old individuals with autism compared to 
10-year-old developmentally normal children, regardless of the difference 
between groups in diagnosis. But why, then did the older individuals with autism 
show superior performance compared with the other groups only on the 
unsegmented form? This brings us to the final problem with the data from this 
study. In both groups of individuals with autism, there were improvements in 
performance when patterns were presented in segmented form. This strongly 
suggests that segmentation facilitated all groups, regardless of diagnosis. 
Although these improvements in the groups with autism were presumably 
nonsignificant (simple effects were unfortunately not reported), this is some 
indication that performance in the groups with autism was at ceiling in the 
segmented version. Thus, if the patterns had been more difficult, individuals with 
autism may have shown superior performance on both the unsegmented and 
segmented patterns compared with the other groups, a result that would require 
some other explanation than weak central coherence.  
 
The evaluation of the weak central coherence hypothesis so far may seem overly 
harsh. After all, those studies that ostensibly provide evidence against the weak 
central coherence hypothesis do so by presenting nonsignificant differences 
between groups with and without autism (Mottron & Breville, 1993; Ozonoff et 
al., 1994; Plaisted et al., 1999) and null results can be argued either way. The 
argument against the weak central coherence hypothesis might seem more 
compelling if a group with autism performed on a task in the opposite way to 
that predicted by weak central coherence. Such a result was found when 
performance on conjunctive visual search tasks was compared between children 
with autism and developmentally normal children (Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-
Cohen, 1998a). These tasks require participants to search for a target that shares 
features with two or more simultaneously presented sets of distracters, such as a 
green X target among green T and red X distracters. Because the detection of this 
target among such distracters requires integration of the colour feature green 
and the shape feature X, the weak central coherence hypothesis predicts that 
children with autism should perform significantly worse compared with 
developmentally normal children. In direct contradiction, we found that children 
with autism were significantly faster. This result is hardly amenable to the idea 
that priming a gestalt target by instruction (the children were told to look for a 
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green X), boosts the otherwise weak central coherence processes, because this 
merely predicts that the performance of the two groups would not differ. The 
finding of superior performance in the opposite direction to that predicted by 
weak central coherence requires an entirely different explanation. The 
explanation I shall offer later not only accounts for this superior performance, 
but also suggests an alternative explanation for the other demonstrations of 
superior performance in perceptual-attentional tasks that have generally been 
regarded as weak central coherence effects.  
 
Evaluating conceptual weak central coherence 
 
In contrast to perceptual weak central coherence, conceptual weak central 
coherence has received relatively little direct empirical testing. However, there 
are phenomena within the literature that are certainly consistent with the idea 
that children with autism are less able to extract meaning from a given array of 
information. For example, Hermelin and O’Connor (1967) found that children 
with autism were less able than developmentally delayed children to chunk 
items according to categories from a word sequence that exceeded memory 
span. Similarly, Tager-Flusberg (1991) found that children with autism, unlike 
developmentally normal and learning disabled children, were not facilitated in 
immediate free recall by semantic similarity in a list of nouns. 
 
The better known studies that are cited in support of conceptual weak central 
coherence have assessed the ability of individuals with autism to correctly 
pronounce homographs within the context of sentences. Frith & Snowling (1983) 
found that children with autism read fewer homographs correctly in context 
compared with developmentally normal and dyslexic children. This is consistent 
with the idea that individuals with autism are less able to extract the “gist”, 
which might normally determine the correct pronunciation. Unfortunately, this 
study did not determine whether or not this effect is specific to autism, since the 
developmentally normal children, although significantly better at homograph 
pronunciation than children with autism, were significantly poorer than the 
children with dyslexia, raising the possibility that these group differences 
emerged because of differences in general mental functioning. Although IQ 
scores were not reported for the developmentally normal children, it is possible 
that they were of lower average IQ than the group of children with dyslexia (the 
upper IQ limit in that group was over two standard deviations above the mean) 
and of higher average IQ than the children with autism (the lower IQ limit in the 
group of children with autism was over three standard deviations below the 
mean). 
 
The specificity of the homograph pronunciation effect to autism was further 
challenged by Snowling and Frith (1986), who assessed children with autism, 
children with learning disabilities and developmentally normal children on the 
homograph task. Half of each group of children were of high verbal ability and 
the other half were of low verbal ability. Regardless of diagnosis, children of high 
verbal ability scored higher than children of low verbal ability.  Furthermore, 
there were no differences in performance between the three groups of children 
of low verbal ability. These findings appear to confirm the impression given by 
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Frith and Snowling’s data (1983) that using context to disambiguate homograph 
pronunciation has less to do with weak central coherence in autism than with 
low general mental functioning. 
 
Two further studies need to be taken into account before accepting this 
conclusion. In Happé’s (1997) study (discussed previously), the group of 
individuals with autism who passed second-order-theroy-of-mind tasks had a 
full-scale IQ of less than one standard deviation below the mean and, unlike the 
developmentally normal group (whose IQ data were not reported), showed no 
facilitation in performance when the homograph was presented toward the end 
of the sentence – i.e., after the context had been supplied. And, in a rigorously 
controlled study with respect to IQ matching, Joliffe (1997) compared high-
functioning adults with autism and developmentally normal adults, matched on 
full-scale IQ, on the homograph task, and again found facilitation in the normal 
group when the homograph was presented after the sentence context and no 
facilitation in the group with autism. 
 
It is not clear how the results of these later studies can be reconciled with 
Snowling and Frith’s (1986) data, which showed that homograph 
disambiguation by sentence context is related to general mental functioning. The 
most useful approach is to adopt the stance that when nonautistic individuals 
with low IQ produce patterns of performance that are similar to those of 
individuals with autism, they may do so for entirely different reasons. Thus, 
when studies reveal null results between these two groups, it is not sufficient to 
conclude that performance is determined only by nonspecific low mental 
functioning. What is required in these cases is further testing to decide the case 
one way or another. 
 
Enhanced discrimination and reduced generalization in autism 
 
If, as I have tried to argue, the evidence for weak central coherence at the level of 
perception is not in its favour, it makes sense to consider alternative 
explanations for the kinds of perceptual and attentional abnormalities observed 
in the behaviours of individuals with autism and their superior performance on 
tasks like embedded figures. The alternative that I have been considering is that 
many of the attentional and perceptual abnormalities in autism are phenomena 
of reduced generalization, or a reduced processing of the similarities that hold 
between stimuli and between situations. Specifically, I have drawn from 
elemental theories of generalization, which state that one stimulus will be 
responded to in a similar way to another if they share sufficient features or 
elements in common (e.g., Estes, 1950; Pearce, 1987; Thompson, 1965). If they 
share few features in common, they will be regarded as different stimuli. And, if 
individuals with autism process similarities between stimuli and situations 
poorly compared with normal individuals, then they will tend to view even 
similar stimuli as quite different.  
 
In order to see how this suggestion relates to the performance of individuals 
with autism on the Embedded Figures Task, it is useful to draw an analogy 
between this task and a camouflaged detection task. When, for example, a moth 
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is camouflaged against a piece of bark, it is very difficult to detect because many 
of its features are precisely those of the bark background. Discriminating the 
moth from its background therefore requires processing those features that are 
unique to the moth and not shared in common with the bark (Plaisted & 
Mackintosh, 1995; Plaisted, 1997). Similarly, in the Embedded Figures Task, the 
target contains some features or elements in common with the overall picture 
and some unique features that define it. Detection of the target will therefore be 
enhanced if those unique features are processed well and those features held in 
common with features contained in the rest of the picture are processed poorly. 
In the case of the block-design task, again the final solution will be assisted if an 
individual is able to process well those features that uniquely define the required 
block face and to ignore those features that are held in common with other faces 
that may be required for another part of the design. 
 
Acute processing of unique features hinders rather than helps in other situations 
– such as when trying to transfer learning from one situation to another – 
especially when the two situations share few common features. Poor transfer, or 
generalization, is often observed in autism (e.g. Swettenham, 1996; Ozonoff & 
Miller, 1995). Any simple elemental model of generalization predicts that 
successful transfer under these conditions will occur if those few features that 
are held in common between the two situations are processed rather than those 
features unique to each stimulus and that transfer will be hindered if those 
common features are processed poorly. 
 
The hypothesis that individuals with autism process features unique to a 
situation or stimulus relatively well and features held in common between 
situations or stimuli rather poorly, makes two complimentary predictions. First, 
individuals with autism should show superior performance on a difficult 
discrimination task – i.e., one where stimuli to be discriminated hold many 
elements in common and each possesses very few unique elements. Second, 
individuals with autism should show inferior performance on a task that 
requires categorization of two sets of stimuli.  
 
Support for the first prediction was found in a perceptual-learning task (Plaisted, 
O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 1998b). Perceptual learning describes the 
phenomenon whereby two very similar stimuli, which at first appear 
indistinguishable, become distinguishable following a period of simple exposure. 
As a result of exposure to the stimuli, elements held in common (and which 
initially prevent discrimination) become less salient and the unique elements of 
each stimulus become relatively more salient (see McLaren, Kaye, & Mackintosh, 
1989, for a model of the mechanisms underlying perceptual learning). If, 
however, individuals with autism process the unique elements of stimuli well 
and the common elements poorly, they should not require exposure to the 
stimuli in order to discriminate them. In our experiment (Plaisted et al., 1998b), 
we compared high functioning adults with autism and normal adults on their 
ability to perform two discriminations. One discrimination involved two highly 
similar stimuli that had been preexposed, the other involved two entirely novel 
similar stimuli. The group of normal adults showed the classic perceptual 
learning effect; they solved the discrimination between the two preexposed 
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stimuli significantly better than the discrimination between the two novel, non-
preexposed stimuli. The group of adults with autism, however, performed 
significantly better on the novel discrimination problem compared with the 
normal adults. They also did not show the perceptual learning effect: they 
performed as well on the discrimination involving novel stimuli as on the 
discrimination involving the preexposed stimuli. This is consistent with the idea 
that unique features are processed well and common features processed poorly 
by individuals with autism and relates to the nature of the stimuli employed in 
this task. The stimuli that were preexposed contained only some features in 
common to those presented during the test phase. Furthermore, these features 
were also held in common between the two stimuli in the test discrimination, 
and were therefore the features to be ignored when trying to solve the 
discrimination. Thus, benefiting from preexposure in this procedure required 
participants to process those features of the test stimuli that were held in 
common with the preexposure stimuli as familiar. This would therefore facilitate 
the test discrimination. However, if individual with autism do not process 
common features well – whether those held between two concurrently 
experienced stimuli or those held between the current experience and prior 
experience - such facilitation would not occur.  
 
Support for the second prediction, that individuals with autism should show a 
deficit in categorization, was found using a prototype abstraction task (Plaisted, 
O’Riordan, Aitken, & Killcross, submitted). When typical adults are first trained 
to categorize two sets of exemplars, they are subsequently able to categorize the 
prototype of each set more accurately than other nonprototypical exemplars, 
even though they have never experience the prototype before. Any explanation 
of this prototype effect appeals to a mechanism of estimating the similarity 
between exemplars. Because the prototype is the central tendency of the set of 
training exemplars, its similarity to the trained set will be higher than that of any 
other novel but nonprototypical exemplar and it will therefore be categorized 
more accurately. Categorization and prototype abstraction are, therefore, 
phenomena of generalization between the common features of a set of 
exemplars. According to the reduced generalization hypothesis, individual with 
autism should show a deficit in category learning in the initial categorization 
phase of a prototype experiment and a reduced prototype effect in comparison 
to normal subjects. Both predictions were supported.  
 
The hypothesis also provides an explanation of their superior performance on 
the aforementioned conjunctive visual search task (Plaisted, et al., 1998a). The 
conjunctive visual search task is difficult for developmentally normal individuals 
precisely because there is high similarity between the target and the distracters 
(Duncan & Humphries, 1989). However, if this similarity is processed less well 
by individual with autism, the target effectively “pops out” from the other items 
in the array. We tested this further by administering to high-functioning children 
with autism and developmentally normal children conjunctive search tasks that 
varied target-distracter similarity. Increasing the similarity between targets and 
distracters impeded the performance of the developmentally normal children, 
but not the children with autism (O’Riordan & Plaisted, in press). 
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Thus, the hypothesis of reduced generalization appears to provide an alternative 
account for the kinds of phenomena often descried as perceptual weak central 
coherence and has generated novel predictions that are supported in a variety of 
tasks. One remaining important question is how well this hypothesis can account 
for the phenomena described as conceptual weak central coherence. My 
argument is that it is often the unique features of a situation that are the least 
important when trying to make sense of an experience - understanding is much 
more easily derived from assimilating current experience with what one already 
knows. But assimilation can be successful only if one recognizes that there are 
features of the current situation that have been encountered in previous 
situations – i.e., are held in common with those past experiences. Any reduction 
in the processing of common features will cause a deficit in this process of 
bringing prior experience to bear on new experiences. In effect, this amounts to a 
deficit in extracting the meaning or gist of a current experience. Furthermore, 
the proposal that individuals with autism process unique features somewhat 
better than developmentally normal individual can account for why individuals 
with autism notice features that seem obscure or irrelevant – these are likely to 
be the unique features, which are generally rejected by the normal individual as 
irrelevant because they are unable to contribute to the process of assimilation. 
 
Possible Mechanisms Underlying Reduced Generalization 
 
The hypothesis that individuals with autism process unique features well and 
common features poorly compared with nonautistic individuals is based on 
theories that state that any stimulus is represented as a set of elements (e.g., 
Esters, 1950; McLaren et al., 1989). These elemental theories of stimulus 
representation provide a foundation from which speculations may be made 
about why individuals with autism show reduced generalization between stimuli 
that hold features in common. These theories assume that generalization from 
one stimulus to another normally occurs to the degree to which the elements of 
one stimulus are able to excite the elements of the other, by associative 
excitation. Theories differ with respect to what causes that associative excitation. 
For example, the activation of one stimulus representation may excite another by 
virtue of the representation of an outcome with which both stimuli have been 
equally paired in the past. Such an effect is known as acquired equivalence (Hall, 
1992). Alternatively, associations could be formed between each and every 
elements of one stimulus during exposure to that stimulus (so that the individual 
need only sample a small proportion of the total set in order for the full 
representation to be activated). The consequence of that process is 
generalization to another stimulus by the virtue of the elements shared in 
common; that is, the activated common elements of the first stimulus will 
retrieve, by associative excitation, not only its own remaining set of elements, 
but also the remaining elements of the second stimulus that share the activated 
common elements (McLaren et al., 1989). 
 
But any such theory needs also to account for the perceptual learning 
phenomenon – the reduction of generalization over time between stimuli that 
share elements in common. Any reduction in generalization effectively comes 
down to a reduction in the salience of the elements held in common. There are 
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two learning mechanisms known to reduce salience: latent inhibition and 
habituation. Latent inhibition is the phenomena whereby mere exposure to a 
stimulus retards the propensity of that stimulus to enter into association with 
any other stimulus at a later occasion. McLaren et al. (1989) proposed that latent 
inhibition is the primary process that reduces generalization between two 
stimuli to preclude perceptual learning (i.e., enhanced discrimination). They 
assume that during exposure to the two stimuli, each element of each stimulus 
gradually becomes latently inhibited. However, because the elements common to 
both stimuli, are, in effect, presented twice as often as the unique elements, they 
will become twice as latently inhibited as the unique elements. Thus, by the end 
of preexposure, the common elements are relatively less salient than the unique 
elements, and therefore the unique elements are better able to enter into new 
associations with the discriminative response. This leads to better 
discrimination, or reduced generalization. Is it possible, then, that mechanisms of 
latent inhibition operate with greater efficiency in autism? Possibly – but this 
would not explain our finding that individuals with autism show enhanced 
discrimination between highly similar stimuli. Enhanced latent inhibition would 
affect common and unique elements equally, and if the unique elements were 
very much less salient for the individual with autism compared with other 
individuals, one might even expect the opposite result.  
 
Differences in the processes of habituation, however, could well account for the 
reduced generalization we have observed in autism. Killcross and Hall (in 
preparation) propose that perceptual learning (or reduced generalization) in any 
individual is the result of differential habituation (rather than latent inhibition) 
of common and unique elements. Habituation is a nonassociative learning 
process in which repeatedly presented stimuli lose their capacity to elicit a 
response. Like McLaren et al. (1989), Killcross and Hall propose that common 
elements will lose salience at faster rate than unique elements because they are 
presented twice as often as unique elements, but through habituation rather 
than latent inhibition. However, they additionally propose that in the case of 
similar stimuli, common elements will, at the outset, be more salient per se than 
unique elements. They will therefore receive greater processing of the sort that 
leads to habituation than will unique elements. Thus, during preexposure, the 
common elements will be more than twice reduced in salience compared with 
the unique elements. This possibility simultaneously predicts our empirical 
results of more rapid discrimination performance and poorer prototype 
abstraction in categorisation tasks.  
 
This analysis of reduced generalization is based on learning mechanisms that 
may reduce associative excitation between encoded elements of two or more 
stimuli. However, a reduction in associative excitation could be the outcome of 
differences in even more fundamental processes, such as perception. For 
example, Gustafsson (1997) proposed that the excellent discrimination skills 
that have been observed among persons with autism could be caused by 
excessive lateral inhibition between neurons. This, he argues, would impact the 
development of cortical maps, which respond to a range of stimuli that share 
certain common properties (Kohonen, 1984). Furthermore, since lateral 
inhibition is a general mechanism that operates throughout the central nervous 
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system, excessive lateral inhibition could affect processing at any level, including 
perception. This kind of suggestion raises the possibility that perception in 
autism is altered such that stimuli are perceived with greater acuity and thus 
with greater differentiation, allowing small and seemingly irrelevant stimuli to 
be perceived as important and salient features.  
 
This might account not only for the superior performance of individuals with 
autism on the Embedded Figures Task but also other effects such as enhanced 
local processing on variants of the Navon task that do not prime participants to 
attend to the global level. Kimchi (1992) argues that the local parts of a 
hierarchical stimulus are only perceived when the elements are large and few in 
number. When they are small and densely spaced, they are perceived instead 
simply as the texture of the overall figure (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982). Perceiving 
local parts of a whole therefore depends on the extent to which the elements are 
perceived as differentiated. The suggestion that perception in autism operates to 
enhance the differentiation of perceptual elements, therefore, predicts that 
individuals with autism will perceive the elements as local parts in hierarchical 
stimuli in which normal individuals perceive elements as texture. But why 
should this lead to enhanced local processing in autism?  According to Kimchi 
(1992), the dominance of global processing over local processing in 
developmentally normal individuals occurs only when the elements are 
perceived as texture. However, when the elements are larger and more sparse, 
developmentally normal individuals show dominance of local processing 
(Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; McLean, 1979). Making elements larger and more sparse 
effectively increases the differentiation between them, so that they are perceived 
as forms rather than simply as texture (Julesz, 1981). Thus, if the elements of a 
particular hierarchical stimulus are more greatly differentiated for an individual 
with autism than for a developmentally normal individual, they may show 
enhanced local processing compared with that of an individual without autism. 
 
Conception and Categorisation in Autism 
 
The proposal that perception operates differently in autism to allow for finer 
registration of the available stimuli has important implications for concept 
formation and category structure in autism and for whether individuals with 
autism can or cannot categorize. Frith (1989) argued from the weak central 
coherence hypothesis that individuals with autism have the capacity to 
categorize, but may not see the need to. Although children with autism do not 
categorize as well as developmentally normal children, they rarely show deficits 
compared with mentally handicapped children matched for mental age (e.g., 
Tager-Flusberg, 1985; Ungerer & Sigman, 1987). I argued elsewhere, however, 
(Plaisted, 2000) that the capacity of children with autism to form categories is 
rarely assessed; more often, children’s preexisting knowledge of concepts such 
as vegetables, furniture, or vehicles is the focus of study. Furthermore, 
researchers typically use sorting or matching-to-sample procedures, which 
assess simple simultaneous matching processes rather than categorization 
processes. In one exception, Klinger and Dawson (1995) compared typically 
developing children, children with learning disabilities, and children with autism 
on a prototype abstraction task. They found that the performance of children 
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with autism was no worse than that of children with learning disabilities, 
although they showed poor prototype abstraction compared with typically 
developing children. However, our finding of high-functioning adults with no 
associated mental handicap who show a deficit in prototype abstraction 
(Plaisted et al., submitted) strongly suggests that deficits in categorisation in 
autism arise for different reasons than the deficits seen in individuals with 
learning disabilities. One strong candidate is a difference in perception that leads 
to poor processing of elements or features held in common among stimuli. I 
suggest that this impinges on all levels of psychological processing.  
 
The most likely response to this is that such differences in perceptual processing 
would lead only to a deficit in categorisation tasks based on perceptual 
similarity. Such an objection is based on the long-held and traditional view that 
there is dissociation between perceptual similarity on the one hand and abstract, 
rule-based classification on the other. This traditional view holds that cognitive 
processes operate entirely independently of perpetual processes and that 
concepts are formed on the basis of either perceptual similarities or amodal 
symbols.  
 
More recent views have vigorously challenged this dissociation between 
perception and abstract conception (Goldstone & Barsalou, 1998; Barsalou & 
Prinz, 1997; Mackintosh, 2000). In their article, Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) 
mount a persuasive case that conceptual processing is dependent on and derives 
from perception, not only with respect to perpetual similarity but also to 
abstract rules. More specifically, they argue that “mechanisms that represent 
shape, colour and location in perception, also represent shape, colour and 
location in concepts” (p. 232). In support of their argument, they note the 
following findings: that categorisation according to an abstract rule is preceded 
by categorizing exemplars according to perceptual similarity (Allen & Brooks, 
1991); that many symbolic concepts derive from perceptual representations 
(Stigler, 1984; Barwise & Etchemendy, 1991); and that individuals perceptually 
stimulate the referents of concepts (Wu, 1995; Solomon, 1997). They also 
highlight the link between perceptually and conceptually based selective 
attention processes. For example, negative priming (in which a target stimulus 
on a second trial is responded to more slowly if it had previously occupied the 
role of an irrelevant distracter on the first trial) is observed using both physically 
identical stimuli and semantically identical stimuli (Tipper, 1985). Goldstone and 
Barsalou (1998) pointed out that such studies reveal that perceptually and 
conceptually based conception share processes of selective attention and 
inhibition.  
 
If conception, or abstract thought, derives from perception, and perception is 
different in individuals with autism in the ways I suggest, then it follows that the 
structure and content of concepts will be quite different in autism. Specifically, 
the idea that perception in autism enhances the discriminability of stimuli 
predicts that category boundaries will be sharper and category content much 
narrower in autism than in typically developing individuals. Furthermore, these 
qualities of concepts will serve to restrict further development and enrichment 
of categories and concepts. If categories have sharper boundaries, then it is less 
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likely that novel unusual exemplars (i.e., those that might lie at the category 
boundary for the developmentally normal individual) will be recognized and 
encoded as part of an existing category. Such exemplars might therefore be 
considered meaningless and ignored as a consequence. It is clear what this might 
mean to understanding emotional expression: It is well known that emotional 
expressions undergo categorisation during early infancy (e.g., Kestenbaum & 
Nelson, 1990). However, the child with autism might be expected to encode a 
highly restricted set of expressions within an emotion concept compared with 
what a typically developing child might encode and thus ignore, or be unable to 
understand, an unusual facial configuration as an exemplar of a particular 
emotion. It is also clear how this might relate to the fact that individuals with 
autism develop highly restricted interests. These interests tend to be 
characterized by very specific exemplars, so that a child with autism might be 
fascinated by a certain make of car, but entirely uninterested in other makes, let 
alone other forms of transport. Young typically developing children similarly 
become fascinated with particular categories of stimuli. However, unlike the 
child with autism, these categories broaden so that one interest leads onto 
another. 
 
Narrower concepts and sharper category boundaries also have important 
implications for semantic processing, or extracting meaning, because these 
qualities would reduce the likelihood of activation by associative excitation of 
concepts that could be brought to bear on making sense of the current array of 
stimuli. Indeed, a reduction in associative excitation could account for conceptual 
weak central coherence effects, such as performance on the homograph task. 
According to several theories of word recognition, an initial lexical-access stage 
involves the activation of several meanings of the fixated word and the 
appropriate meaning is subsequently selected given the context provided by the 
sentence (Onifer & Swinney, 1981; Seidenberg, Tanenhaus, Leiman & 
Bienkowski, 1982; Rayner & Frazier, 1989). However, in autism, reduced 
associative excitation predicts that fewer meanings may be initially activated, 
resulting in an impoverished input on which selection processes can operate.  
 
There are other implications of a reduction in associative excitation as a result of 
narrower concepts and sharper category boundaries. For example, associative 
excitation is at the heart of generativity. It is a common experience that one 
thought sparks or generates another and, in reflecting on a thought sequence, 
one can recognize the features or elements of one thought that give rise to the 
next and so on. But a reduction in associative excitation, as a result of the kinds 
of processes I have outlined, would lead to generativity deficits, deficits that are 
well documented in autism (Jarrold, Boucher, & Smith, 1996). 
 
Finally, I should consider how this analysis might be brought to bear on social 
information processing in autism. It is a popular view that the social world is 
enormously complex and highly variable. No doubt this is true – but it would be 
extreme to propose that there are no regularities that occur across social 
situations. Development of social cognition could therefore be conceived (at least 
in part) as the abstraction of widely applicable social rules by generalization 
across these regularities, and effective social behaviours in any particular 
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situation can be seen as the utilization of the relevant social rules. And what 
determines and activates the relevant set of rules, of course, are those features of 
the current social situation that have been reliably present in previous similar 
social situations. But a deficit in the ability to process those common features, as 
observed in our experiments with individuals with autism, will result in a deficit 
in the abstraction of social rules, and the consequent reduction in associative 
excitation will result in poor social interaction and social understanding in any 
one situation. It may therefore be that the superior processing of those features 
that are unique to a situation and the poor processing of those features held in 
common among situations substantially contribute to the profound deficits in 
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